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Taking my cue from feminist curiosity and literature on the everyday in surveillance 
studies, I am proposing ‘democratic curiosity’ as a tool for revisiting the question of 
democracy in times of extitutional surveillance. Democratic curiosity seeks to bring 
into analytical play the social and political power of little nothings —the power of 
subjects, things, practices, relations that are rendered trivial — and uncoordinated 
disputes they enact. Revisiting democracy from this angle is particularly pertinent in 
extitutional situations in which the organisation and practices of surveillance are 
spilling beyond their panoptic configurations. Extitutional surveillance is strongly 
embedded in diffusing arrangements of power and ever more extensively enveloped 
in everyday life and banal devices. To a considerable degree these modes of 
surveillance escape democratic institutional repertoires that seek to bring broader 
societal concerns to bear upon surveillance. Extitutional enactments of democracy 
then become an important question for both security and surveillance studies. 
 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Pinelopi Troullinou and Amandine Scherrer for research assistance and 
comments on an earlier draft, Paul Stenner for introducing the concept of ‘extitution’ to me, and the 
reviewers for helpful suggestions. The argument also benefited considerably from the comments and 
questions by Claudia Aradau, Marieke de Goede and the audience on my lecture ‘Security and 
democracy’ in the lecture series ‘Being on the line: citizenship, identities and governance in times of 
crises,’ organized by the Centre for Citizenship, Identities and Governance, Open University.  
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A 2013 study on mass surveillance requested by the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs states that the key question 
following the Snowden revelations on US mass surveillance is: “What nature, scale 
and depth of surveillance can be tolerated in and between democracies?”2 This is 
clearly an important political question. Not too many will contest that the implications 
of surveillance for democracy are one of the important political challenges of our 
times. Asking how much surveillance democracy can tolerate is not the only question 
we need to ask today, however. Implicitly running through the question is the 
assumption that if there is sufficient political will democratic institutions can both 
define what level of surveillance is compatible with democracy and constrain 
surveillance to this effect. Yet, what if institutional democratic repertoires cannot or 
can only to a limited extent bear upon surveillance because the latter is organised and 
practiced in ways that to a large degree escape control and authorisation practices of 
key democratic institutions? If the latter is the case then we need to ask another set of 
questions too. What can democracy mean in relation to surveillance situations upon 
which institutional democratic repertoires have only limited grip? What mode of 
enquiry can be developed that researches the interstices between democracy and 
surveillance without limiting democratic practice to familiar institutional repertoires? 
 
Surveillance refers here to ‘assorted forms of monitoring, typically for the ultimate 
purpose of intervening in the world.’3 Although surveillance cannot be reduced to 
security practice, the Snowden revelations place the concern with surveillance 
squarely at the interstices between the extraction and circulation of data and security 
and intelligence practices. The tense relation between security, surveillance and 
democracy is not new. The enhanced focus on counter-terrorism since 2001 has led to 
various debates about the nature, scale and depth of surveillance that can be tolerated 
in democracies. The relation between surveillance and security practice is not always 
straightforward and depends to a considerable extent on what one calls security and 
                                                
2 Bauman, Zygmunt, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves, Elspeth Guild, Vivienne Jabri, David Lyon, and 
R.B.J. Walker. "After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance." International Political 
Sociology 8:2 (2014), p. 11. 
Similar concerns have been expressed elsewhere: e.g. by Human Rights Watch in the US: Human 
Rights Watch. 2014. With liberty to monitor all. (Human Rights Watch 2014), p. 4. 
3 Haggerty, Kevin D., and Minas Samatas. "Surveillance and Democracy: An Unsettled Relation." In 
Surveillance and Democracy, edited by Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas Samatas. (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010), p. 2 
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the wider political and social processes in relation to which one researches 
surveillance. For example, surveillance studies that are largely drawn on in security 
studies are mostly embedded in criminology and police studies. Yet, studies of 
surveillance cover a wider range of interests. Feminist surveillance studies for 
example focuses on how surveillance genders and racially renders bodies across a 
wide range of surveillance practices, including foetus scanning, genetic technology, 
tweeting, and domestic violence.4 Analyses of the nature and effects of governing by 
means of big data and extracting transactional data for economic purposes are another 
example of how surveillance issues arise beyond the security and policing realm.5 In 
this article I will remain close to the criminological and policing literature on 
surveillance that is most directly linked to security issues. I will not explicitly qualify 
what is particular about the security rationale of surveillance, however.6 The aim here 
is to draw out a set of issues about democracy and surveillance from the surveillance 
literature. Given that security practice is taking place in and shaping a wider societal 
intensification of surveillance 7 , the challenges for democracy and the 
conceptualisation of democratic practice in times of surveillance that I develop bear 
upon specific security contexts too. 
 
Security and surveillance studies usually do not make democracy a driving category 
of their analyses.8 Instead they tend to focus on the nature of surveillance, its novel 
developments, reasons for it, and its implications. What is specific about mass 
surveillance?9 Do the Snowden revelations reveal a novel form of surveillance? The 
                                                
4 Dubrofsky, Rachel, and Shoshana Amielle Magnet, eds. Feminist surveillance studies. (London: 
Duke University Press 2015) 
5 Ruppert, Evelyn, and Mike Savage, "Transactional politics."  Sociological Review 59:s2 (2011), pp. 
73-92; Madsen, Anders Koed, Web-visions. Repurposing digital traces to organize social attention. 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School, Doctoral thesis, 2013 
6 I have done this work in my book Security Unbound where I identify the securitizing technique of 
surveillance as ‘assembling suspicion’ and draw out how it differs from a technique of security that 
foregrounds intensified relations between enemies or sudden ‘life-threatening’ disruptions: Huysmans, 
Jef, Security Unbound. Enacting Democratic Limits. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
7 Andrejevic, Mark, "Foreword." In Feminist Surveillance Studies., edited by Rachel Dubrofsky and 
Shoshana Amielle Magnet. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), no pages in e-book version.  
8 One of the few exceptions is the volume Surveillance and Democracy edited by Haggerty and 
Samatas (Haggerty and Samatas 2010a). 
9 Mass surveillance refers to large increases in the scale of data extraction and analysis; it risks blurring 
the line between targeted surveillance - justified for the purpose of fighting crime - and data mining. 
Bigo, Didier, Sergio Carrera, Nicholas Hernanz, Julien Jeandesboz, Joanna Parkin, Francesco Ragazzi, 
and Amandine Scherrer, National programmes for mass surveillance of personal data in EU member 
states and their compatibility with EU law. (Brussels: European Parliament's Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2013), p. 15. 
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emphasis is very much on understanding surveillance. Democracy enters mostly as 
something that is negatively impacted upon by surveillance but not in itself a driving 
analytical category. Alternatively, it enters towards the end of the analysis when one 
asks ‘What can be politically done?’ as a repertoire of practices that can be mobilised 
to politically limit surveillance. Democracy here tends to be primarily understood in 
terms of familiar institutionalised repertoires of action such as the protection of 
fundamental rights in court procedures, parliamentary overview, mobilisation of 
protest in the public sphere, and demands for legal, administrative and political 
organisation of transparency and accountability.  
 
In this article I want to make an argument for lingering a little longer with democracy 
and in particular with the question of how to bring the relation between democracy 
and surveillance into analyses of the politics of surveillance. I propose ‘democratic 
curiosity’ as a tool for avoiding that analyses of surveillance slip too comfortably into 
studying the details of surveillance and questioning them from the standpoint of 
institutionalised repertoires of democratic practice. The main reason for this is not that 
the analyses of how the tensions between security, surveillance and democracy play 
out specifically today are wrong or poor in the insights they generate. Yet, the impact 
of state organised democratic institutions cannot be taken for granted when 
surveillance is diffusing in the sense of being both non-intense or banal and dispersed 
with no clear centralising decision making and controlling centre. In these cases, the 
challenge for democracy is not simply that surveillance is challenging democratic 
institutions and rights but that there seems to be a mismatch between the organisation 
of the power of surveillance and the arrangement of democratic power that seeks to 
limit and shape surveillance in line with legal and wider normative frameworks, 
popular power, and democratic notions of accountability, equality and fairness.10   
 
Against this background it is important to ask if there is more to democracy than the 
institutional eyes see and what a ‘democratic analytics’ can be that takes us beyond 
institutional repertoires of democratic action. The paper develops in two main parts. 
                                                
10 Ulrich Beck asked a similar question in light of the Snowden revelations, emphasising in particular 
the limits of nation-state democracy, law and citizens protests: Beck, Ulrich. "The Digital Freedom 
Risk: Too Fragile an Acknowledgment." openDemocracy, 30 August 2013. Available at: 
{https://opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/ulrich-beck/digital-freedom-risk-too-fragile-
acknowledgment} accessed 22 July 2015.  
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Drawing on surveillance studies, the first two sections introduce how surveillance 
practices are today extitutionally rather than panoptically organised and why this 
requires us to linger a little longer and more explicitly with the democratic question in 
surveillance studies. The next sections introduce ‘democratic curiosity’ as a method 
of extitutional enquiry that seeks to take political sociologies of surveillance beyond 
the limits of institutional repertoires of democratic action. I develop a reading of the 
democratic political significance of little nothings as uncoordinated disputes. It 
provides the conceptual basis for an extitutional understanding of democracy in times 
of surveillance that differs from the often-used idea of politics as resistance. 
Extitutional	surveillance	
The notion of big brother and the panoptic organisation of surveillance continue to 
structure political debates on surveillance. Yet many analyses of surveillance have 
highlighted that surveillance works quite differently in many instances. Since we 
started with a quotation referring to the Snowden revelations, let’s continue with that 
example. Recently, a group of surveillance and security analysts emphasised that the 
revelations demonstrate developments in surveillance that are so pervasive and 
complex that they are not fully understood and challenge the conceptual canons of 
surveillance and security studies.  
“We seem to be engaging with phenomena that are organized neither horizontally, 
in the manner of an internationalized array of more or less self-determining and 
territorialized states, nor vertically in the manner of a hierarchy of higher and 
lower authorities. Relations, lines of flight, networks, integrations and 
disintegrations, spatiotemporal contractions and accelerations, simultaneities, 
reversals of internality and externality, increasingly elusive boundaries between 
inclusion and exclusion or legitimacy and illegitimacy: the increasing familiarity 
of these, and other similar notions, suggests a powerful need for new conceptual 
and analytical resources.”11 
It is an important observation, especially when drawing on the case of the Snowden 
revelations. The latter does invite analyses to fall back on familiar categories, tropes 
and repertoires. Despite the dispersed network of agencies, data flows, and private-
public partnerships the focus is firmly on a surveillance programme controlled by 
state security institutions and linked to deploying disciplinary and coercive force. The 
revelations also deployed familiar actions of politicising surveillance. A whistle-
blower leaked voluminous materials evidencing mass surveillance by the state; 
newspapers published the information gradually over a longer time period so as to 
                                                
11 Bauman et al. (2014), p. 124 
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sustain public debate; parliamentary and extra-parliamentary queries demanded 
accountability for what was happening and questioned or defended the legitimacy of 
the practice on legal, normative and security grounds. It is thus a classic case of 
centralised, state organised security practices being politically contested through 
familiar democratic processes. The article quoted above, however, warns implicitly 
that one should not settle too easily and comfortably in these familiar modes of 
understanding and engaging surveillance practice and its politicisation. Mass 
surveillance is part of wider developments that have unsettled the familiar categories 
through which we understand surveillance and the possibilities for democratic 
politics.12  
 
These developments in surveillance are not as new and obscure as the quote may 
suggest, however. They have been extensively written about in surveillance studies. 
Of particular interest are the analyses that question the panoptic model of control and 
power.13 In its panoptic model surveillance is a relation between the watched and the 
watcher within a bounded, territorialised institution, like a prison, factory, or asylum. 
There is a central and centralising power that credibly claims and exercises a capacity 
to see what those living within the bounded place are up to. Power works by those 
subjected to surveillance internalising prescribed patterns of practice because those 
with the power to coerce can be monitoring transgressions and subsequently punish 
them by taking away certain rights and opportunities, exercise violence, humiliate, 
and so on. Significant practices of surveillance do however currently not work in such 
bounded institutional spaces and their hierarchical organisation of visibility; or, at 
least, they cannot be fully understood as institutionally bound. One of the early dents 
into the panoptic framework was the observation that new technologies and social 
media distributed the possibility for using surveillance across a wider population. The 
watched started also watching the watchers thereby inverting the panoptic structure. 
                                                
12 See also: Lyon, David, "Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: capacities, consequences, critique."  
Big Data & Society 1:2 (2014), pp. 1-13 
13 Haggerty, Kevin D., and Richard V. Ericson, "The surveillant assemblage."  British Journal of 
Sociology 51:4 (2000), pp. 605-622; Haggerty, Kevin D, "Tear down the walls: on demolishing the 
panopticon." In David Lyon (ed) Theorizing surveillance: the panopticon and beyond (Cullompton: 
Willan, 2006), pp. 23-45; Bauman, Zygmunt, and David Lyon, Liquid surveillance. (Cambridge, 
Polity, 2013) 
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Under conditions of what Mathiesen14 coined ‘synoptic surveillance’  surveillance did 
no longer simply work top down — state upon citizens, employers upon workers, the 
police upon suspected groups and individuals — but experienced a democratic 
levelling of the hierarchies implied in the panoptic model and a fracturing of the 
organisation of control. Getting hold of abusive practices of those in authority and 
spreading them through social media and traditional news channels are a classic 
example.  
 
In synoptic surveillance the emphasis is very much on a reversal; on rendering the 
relation of control between watched and watcher more complex by looking at cases in 
which the hierarchy of power is inverted or in which surveillance is at least less 
unidirectional. Yet, its implications go further. When surveillance becomes 
decentralised and more distributed it breaks out of its institutional bounds allowing 
multi-directional connections. These understandings of surveillance are not limited to 
post-Snowden. For example, Dupont analyses the internet in a similar way.  
“In this model of information management, it is much harder for a central 
authority to control the flow of data than in a panoptic environment, while at the 
same time, it becomes much easier for a myriad of actors to observe and monitor 
their peers, since the distribution of ties also creates a hyper-connectivity 
conducive to the multilateralization of surveillance.”15 
The issue here not a mere reversal of panoptic into synoptic surveillance but an 
understanding that variations of the analytical categories based on the panoptic model 
do not provide adequate leverage for understanding contemporary surveillance. Like 
Bauman et al, Dupont’s argument is not that surveillance is simply horizontal and 
democratic; it remains stratified and central institutional authorities continue to play a 
significant role. Yet, for him the panoptic model ‘can only be of limited assistance to 
analyze the distributed structure of supervision, and its disconnect from any 
disciplinary and social sorting project.’16 Haggerty and Ericson introduced the notion 
of ‘surveillance assemblage' to express a similar concern. Picking up on the diffuse 
nature of much of contemporary surveillance they argue for studying surveillance 
                                                
14 Mathiesen, Thomas. "The Viewer Society. Michel Foucault's 'Panopticon' Revisited." Theoretical 
Criminology 1:2, 1997, pp. 215-34 
15 Dupont, Benoît. "Hacking the Panopticon: Distributed Online Surveillance and Resistance." 
Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance 10 (2008), p. 262. 
16 Dupont (2008), p. 268 
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assemblages arranging a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements, agencies and 
relations that come together as a functional entity with no clear boundaries.17 
 
The political challenge here is that these modes of surveillance cannot be steered or 
contested simply by focusing on an institutional entity.18 As Bogard in his formulation 
of post-panoptic control states:  
“This [post-panoptic] form of control does not depend on interiors, yet 
nonetheless operates as a form of enclosure. New techniques of statistical tracking 
(e.g. data mining), combined with remote control technologies, allow certain 
production processes to be regulated without concentrating them behind walls or 
allocating them to specific institutional spaces.”19 
The issue for these analyses is that significant practices of surveillance are no longer 
simply where panoptically speaking they are supposed to be. Although the term ‘post-
panoptic’20 nicely captures this idea, I am going to introduce another term.  
 
I prefer to speak of extitutional surveillance, borrowing terminology from Michel 
Serres 21 . The reason is to draw attention specifically to the process of de-
institutionalisation that Bogard’s quote refers to. ‘Extitution’ refers to relations and 
practices of governance in various areas of life, including education, medical practice, 
mental health and security that are dispersing beyond the physical and spatial confines 
of the institutions that exercise them. It includes practices like distance teaching in 
which the university campus is no longer in the first instance a physical place, the 
control of prisoners within society by means of tags, spreading intelligence work 
through increasing involvement of private contractors, and so on. Such extitutional 
worlds separate institutions and the organisation of power in the sense that the 
exercise of power is not primarily taking place within the physical boundaries of the 
traditional institutions like schools, asylum, intelligence agencies and so on but 
significantly more fractured and dispersed.22 The concept ‘extitutional’ retains a more 
                                                
17 Haggerty and Ericson (2000), p. 608 
18 Haggerty and Ericson (2000), p. 609; Lianos, Michalis. "Periopticon: Control Beyond Freedom and 
Coercion - and Two Possible Advancements in the Social Sciences." In Kevin D. Haggerty and Minas 
Samatas (eds) Surveillance and Democracy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), pp. 69-88. 
19 Bogard, William, "Simulation and Post-Panopticon." In Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty and David 
Lyon (eds) Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 30-37. 
20 Haggerty (2006); Bogard (2012) 
21 Serres, Michel. Atlas.  (Paris: Flammarion, 1996 [1994]), pp. 195-96. 
22 Tirado, Francisco, and Miquel Domènech. "Extitutions and security: movement as code."  
Informática na educação: teoria e prática 16:1, 2013, pp. 123-138 
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explicit link to the ‘institutional world’ than ‘post-panoptic’ which is important. 
Spatially bounded institutions are transforming but remain important for 
understanding the nature of and transitions into extitutional sites and moments. 
Moreover, it is not the case that surveillance is simply creating a non-institutional 
world of free flowing data, knowledge and intervention; bounded institutions continue 
to be significant. Yet, in extitutional developments the question is what is happening 
to these institutions when the physically bounded space is becoming less important 
for their operation.  
 
In situations of extitutional surveillance, the power of monitoring, registering, 
constructing, and circulating data and rendering subjects as data is highly distributed 
and mobile. Data and the use made of it are detached from the original thick context 
and subjectivities and circulated across agencies with different functions (e.g. train 
companies seeking to optimise provisions and counter-terrorist units tracking 
suspicious mobility). The generation and collection of data is heavily embedded in 
ordinary activities, ranging from shopping and making a phone call over house 
valuation and buying a travel ticket to insuring a car and selecting employees. As 
Tirado and Domènech emphasise, movement and connections established through 
circulations are the structuring forces of extitutional social formations rather than 
institutional confinement. For example, the Snowden revelations may easily suggest a 
mode of highly institutionalised surveillance, organised within and through the NSA 
and a set of core intelligence institutions. Yet, if one starts looking at the movement of 
data and information and how they render and connect subjects, institutions, 
procedures, and things the picture shifts from simply relations between institutions to 
surveillance spilling out of the key institutions and their statutory and operational 
procedures into a vast array of private and public organisations, cables, legal 
instruments, and so on. 23  Intelligence institutions seem to try to confine these 
circulations institutionally but with mixed results, among others given the many 
private organisations involved. 
 
Surveillance spilling out of the institutional walls and operating by means of 
encodings rendered in movements and transactions goes hand in hand with it 
                                                
23 Lyon (2014); Bauman et al (2014); Beck (2013) 
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permeating everyday life. The extraction of personal data for governing conduct is 
part of labour relations, consumption, traffic regulation, counter-terrorism, house 
pricing, entertainment, and so on. It has become difficult if not impossible to go about 
one’s life without being subjected to surveillance and participating in data generating 
practices. This has consequences for how to interpret surveillance for security 
purposes. Following Snowden, much of the justification for mass surveillance — but 
also its contestations — refer to exceptional security practice, i.e. counter-terrorism 
policies. Yet, one of the most disrupting aspects of the revelations was not just the 
scale of the surveillance but how intelligence operations worked by means of data, 
technologies and modes of surveillance that are deeply embedded in a myriad of 
everyday activities, including emailing, on-line shopping, phone calls, and so on. 
Many of these are not encoded and circulated for national security purposes at all. 
Although national security operations are distinct, they exercise surveillance that is 
‘deeply’ embedded in people’s everyday life. Surveillance takes on the characteristics 
of a social formation that is paradoxically very near but also quasi unavoidable and 
untouchable. The exceptionality of certain surveillance practices, like counter-
terrorism, are so thoroughly enveloped in the everyday that it is difficult to maintain 
the boundary between the two. The worlds of security practice can then not simply be 
studied within their own ‘walls’. Instead they are to be read in terms of their 
circulation in, drawing upon, and being embedded in the spread of surveillance 
practice for multiple purposes — or, in other words, in their enactment of what Lyon 
referred to as surveillance societies.24 
 
Subject positions in extitutional surveillance are not just produced by means of the 
institutional organisation of time, space and movement of already existing subjects 
and their hierarchical observation but ‘by codes intended to reproduce the subject in 
advance’. 25  Extitutional subjects are performed rather than simply watched. For 
                                                
24 Lyon, David, Surveillance society. Monitoring everyday life. (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 
2001) 
For example, Ball et al show in great detail how the market logics enacted in private firms shape 
counter-terrorism surveillance: Ball, Kirstie, Ana Canhoto, Elizabeth Daniel, Sally Dibb, Maureen 
Meadows, and Keith Spiller. The private security state? Surveillance, consumer data and the war on 
terror. (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press, 2015). 
25 Bogard (2012), p. 35. 
On questions of subjectivity in relation to new surveillance technologies, see also: Hayles, N. 
Katherine. "RFID: human agency and meaning in information-intensive environments."  Theory, 
Culture & Society 26:2-3 (2009), pp. 47-92. 
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example, Louise Amoore when discussing pre-emptive data-mining highlights how 
‘the subject’ is created from the unknown in the practice of pre-emptive surveillance 
rather than surveillance being a practice working upon an already known subject: 
“… contemporary security practice works on and through the emptiness and the 
void of that which is missing: inferring across elements, embracing uncertain 
futures, seeking out the excess. It is precisely across the gaps of what can be 
known that new subjects and things are called into being.”26 
Such a performance of subjectivity disrupts the panoptic model in which the watchers 
and the watched are given subject positions in an architectural structure. Identities and 
profiles are creating subjects pro-actively. Surveillance creates an unknown subject 
through anonymous algorithmic work on transaction data. For example, in counter-
terrorism some practices render suspected subjects through gathering and patterning 
transactional data that are then inscribed upon an individual. Yet, we should be 
careful to avoid reading these as completely disembodied subjects that are ‘created’ 
ex nihilo. As among others Dubrofsky and Magnet have shown in their collection of 
feminist surveillance studies, existing racial, gender and wealth differences and 
discriminations are inscribed upon subjects in a wide range of surveillance practices.27 
 
These developments challenge familiar categorical distinctions that have been central 
to the social sciences. The at times intense debate on the relevance of the 
public/private distinction in surveillance studies is one example. 28 The difficulty of 
separating internal from external governance in the policing of mobility at a distance 
which dislocates state borders from their geographical place to data banks, consulates, 
random identity checks across the territory, and dispersed detention centres is another 
one.29 Interferences between market logics and security logics30 and the limits of right 
                                                
26 Amoore, Louise. The politics of possibility. Risk and security beyond probability. (Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2013), p. 7. 
27 Dubrofsky, Rachel, and Shoshana Amielle Magnet (eds) Feminist surveillance studies. (London: 
Duke University Press, 2015) 
28 Bennett, Colin J. "In defence of privacy: the concept and the regime."  Surveillance & Society 8:4, 
2011, pp. 485-496;  Regan, Priscilla M. "Response to Bennett: also in defence of privacy." 
Surveillance & Society 8:4, 2011, pp. 497-499; Stalder, Felix. "Autonomy beyond privacy: a rejoinder 
to Bennett."  Surveillance & Society 8:4,  2011, pp. 508-512 
29 Bigo, Didier. "Globalized (in)security: the field and the ban-opticon." In Didier Bigo and Anastassia 
Tsoukala (eds) Terror, Insecurity and Liberty, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 10-48; Jeandesboz, 
Julien. Les usages du voisin. Genèse, enjeux et modalité de voisinage de l'Union européenne. (Doctoral 
Thesis, Ecole Doctoral de Sciences Po, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, 2011; Amoore (2013) 
30 Ball et al (2015); de Goede, Marieke. Speculative security. The politics of pursuing terrorist monies. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Murakami Wood, David. "What Is Global 
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holding subjects when surveillance works through transaction data31 are again other 
examples. One of the questions that is much less explicitly dealt with in surveillance 
studies, however, is the implications of extitutional surveillance for conceptions of 
democracy.  
The	question	of	democracy	
Although there is work done on the relation between democracy and surveillance, the 
question of democracy is not as present in surveillance studies as one might expect. 
Democracy largely remains a backdrop rather than a key analytical category when it 
comes to studying surveillance.32 Alternatively, democracy is present as a selection of 
institutional components, such as rights to privacy and free association, concepts of 
accountability and transparency, and legitimate modes of protest, but not as an 
analytical category in itself.33 This relative absence of the category of ‘democracy’ as 
a question rather than a given set of political repertoires raises a problem in cases of 
extitutional surveillance. While surveillance has gone extitutional, democratic politics 
seems to have largely remained institutional in both the study of surveillance and 
many of the practices that seek to bring democratic values, rights and processes to 
bear upon instances of surveillance. There thus is a mismatch between the 
organisation and sedimenting of the power of surveillance and the understanding of 
democratic power that seeks to limit and shape it in line with legal and wider 
normative frameworks, democratic notions of accountability, equality and fairness, 
and input from popular power and civil society in decisions.34 In some sense one can 
argue that surveillance power is split from political power. The former working 
transversally across political, institutional and disciplinary boundaries with the latter 
remaining strongly linked to territorially bounded political and judicial institutions.35 
                                                                                                                                      
Surveillance? Towards a Relational Political Economy of the Global Surveillant Assemblage." 
Geoforum 49, 2013, pp. 317-26. 
31 Ruppert, Evelyn. "Population objects: interpassive subjects."  Sociology 45:2, 2011, pp. 218-233. 
32 For example: Bigo, Didier. "Security, surveillance and democracy." In Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. 
Haggerty and David Lyon (eds) Routledge handbook of surveillance studies, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012), pp. 277-284. 
33 For Example: de Goede (2012) 
34 This ‘mismatch’ is not limited to surveillance. Analyses of transnationalising and globalising societal 
and economic relations have raised similar issues about the structuring of societal and economic power 
not fitting the territorialised institutional repertoires of democracy in states. For example: Kaiser, Karl. 
"Transnational relations as a threat to the democratic process." In Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye (eds) Transnational Relations and World Politics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1971), 
pp. 356-370; Walker, R.B.J. Inside/Outside: International relations as Political Theory. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 143. 
35 Bauman and Lyon (2013), pp. 5-8 
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This ‘mismatch’ raises questions about the limits of institutionalised democratic 
repertoires of action for effectively exercising political power in situations of 
extitutional surveillance.36 It also raises questions about how to introduce the question 
of democracy into the study of extitutional surveillance. 
 
Taking extitutional arrangements of surveillance serious makes one ask whether many 
political debates on surveillance only give a semblance of democratic control and 
limitation while surveillance practices simply continue to escape democratic limits.  
Surveillance practices seem always already somewhere else or arranged differently, or 
seem to incorporate the democratic limits to further enhance and develop ever more 
sophisticated surveillance. Criticism of prioritising the protection of the right to 
privacy in the study and politicisation of surveillance is a good example. These 
criticisms highlight two issues in particular. First, too much focus on the right to 
privacy distracts from understanding the wider arrangements of power in society and 
everyday practices within which surveillance is embedded. For example, people seem 
to freely reveal private information through social media, loyalty cards, internet 
consumption, and so on. Yet, what does ‘freedom’ mean here when the demand for 
personal data by corporate and public services is often a requirement for receiving 
services, buy goods, and so on. Secondly, focusing on the right to privacy overlooks 
that calls for privacy protection have led to an expansion and further sophistication of 
surveillance. The surveillance industry have embraced it as a technical issue that can 
be dealt with by more discriminatory and more sophisticated surveillance soft and 
hard ware. Not everyone agrees with this criticism of the right to privacy as a key 
politicising tool, however. Although there are certainly many instances and specific 
developments where this criticism holds, making this the default interpretation is 
considered too one-sided. It overlooks the presence of political processes and 
controversies that affect the development of surveillance tools and practices. In these 
privacy can continue to play a significant role, as Colin Bennett, among others, has 
extensively argued.37  
                                                
36 Amoore (2013), de Goede (2012), Lianos (2010) 
Similar concerns have been expressed in relation to contemporary policing practice and financial 
surveillance: Loader, Ian. "Plural policing and democratic governance."  Social & Legal Studies 9:3 
(2000), pp. 323-345; Wood, Jennifer, and Benoît Dupont (eds) Democracy, Society and the governance 
of security. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Amicelle, Anthony. "Towards a 'new' 
political anatomy of financial surveillance."  Security Dialogue 42:2 (2011), pp. 161-178 . 
37 Bennett (2011) 
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Overstating the criticism can also slip into an argument that established institutions 
have no significant presence in extitutional situations at all. The fact that situations are 
extitutional does mean indeed that bounded institutions do not succeed in containing 
surveillance developments and are not the central decision-making and implementing 
power. Yet, that is not the same as saying they have become irrelevant or intentionally 
or unintentionally collusive with surveillance.38 Democratic institutional repertoires 
such as judicial claims to privacy rights and public accountability procedures remain 
important, among others, to keep the question of the legitimacy of certain surveillance 
tools and practices in political play. It may well be that the protection of privacy is a 
problematic category given that people widely participate in making private data 
available but that does not necessarily imply that they would also willingly give up 
private information if they knew it was extracted through mass surveillance by 
intelligence services.39  
 
The issue I want to raise is therefore not that institutional democratic repertoires are 
necessarily defunct in extitutional environments, despite rhetorical temptations to 
draw nice dyads, oppositions, and clear breaks between old and new. I am making a 
more modest claim. The mismatch between extitutional surveillance and institutional 
democratic repertoires means that the question of democratic politics cannot by 
default or uncritically fall back on re-iterating familiar institutional repertoires of 
democratic action. It invites discussion about their effectiveness in limiting the reach 
and scale of surveillance. It also invites revisiting what diffuse exercise of democratic 
power can be and how to embed such a conception of democracy into analyses of 
surveillance. In the next sections, I am focusing on the latter of these two questions 
and in particular on how to move from institutional to extitutional analytics of 
democracy in surveillance studies? I will do this by introducing a mode of enquiry 
that I will call ‘democratic curiosity’.  
                                                
38 For an excellent analysis of this ambiguous nature of democratic repertoires of action, i.e. them 
simultaneously being a repertoire for limiting and enhancing surveillance tools, see: Bellanova, Rocco. 
The politics of data protection: what does data protection do? A study of the interaction between data 
protection and passenger name records dispositifs. (Doctoral thesis, Political and social sciences, 
Université Saint-Louis, Brussels, 2014) 
39 Bauman et al (2014) 
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Towards	an	extitutional	democratic	analytics	
If democratic power is not simply where it is supposed to be, i.e. in institutional 
centres and processes, then where is it? This question resonates with the interest, in 
the various branches of security and policing studies, in adapting democratic 
repertoires to diffuse modes of governance. 40  Existing democratic institutional 
repertoires, such as the rights to association, privacy, and data protection require 
adapting and changing to situations in which centres of security and policing power 
are dispersed into modes of nodal governance, hybrid organisations, and assemblages. 
This literature explores in particular how repertoires of accountability, transparency 
and the participation of social groups and citizens can be organised and how they 
(can) confer — or, contest — legitimacy of surveillance, and more broadly, security 
and policing institutions, techniques and technologies.  
 
Although these approaches contribute to formulating a democratic analytics of 
extitutional situations, I want to concentrate on something that they leave out: how the 
diffusion of surveillance in and through ‘the everyday’ makes ‘the everyday’ a site of 
political practice in its own right. Here another democratic question — other than 
accountability and transparency — arises: how do practices that are considered infra-
political or non-political contest and, more generally, bear upon the enactment of 
surveillance? In this section I introduce three key moves that define ‘democratic 
curiosity’ as an extitutional mode of enquiry that addresses this issue in particular. The 
first move takes understanding curiosity as a disposition towards the significance of 
little nothings and the power of trivialising rather than the uncovering of secrets. The 
second and third moves define the democratic modalities of this curiosity as a mode 
of enquiry. I propose first that a democratic analytics approaches little nothings as 
constituting a situation of multiplicity and immanent relations rather than a 
confrontation between a surveillance system and diffuse forces resisting it. The 
democratic modality of curiosity, secondly, implies a particular conceptualisation of 
the political qualities of this social situation; in other words, it works the boundary 
between the social and the political in a particular way. Democratic curiosity defines 
                                                
40 Abrahamsen, Rita, and Michael C. Williams. "Security beyond the state: global security assemblages 
in international politics."  International Political Sociology 3:1, 2009, pp.1-17; de Goede (2012); de 
Goede, Marieke, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Louise Amoore, Rocco Bellanova, and Quirine Eijkman. "IPS 
Forum: The politics of privacy in the age of preemptive security."  International Political Sociology 
8:1, 2014, pp. 100-118; Lianos (2010); Loader (2000); Wood, Jennifer, and Clifford Shearing. 
Imagining Security. (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2000) 
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this boundary as one where and when the immanent relations between little nothings 
that define the social situation of surveillance turn into uncoordinated disputes. As I 
will explain below, this implies a distinct conception of democratic practice that 
differs from the more commonly used notion of politics in surveillance studies that is 
based on a dialectic of domination and resistance. 
Curiosity	and	the	everyday	
Calls for taking the political significance of ‘the everyday’ serious in relation to 
surveillance are not new. In 1980, de Certeau argued for taking the quotidian serious 
against too dystopian readings of surveillance:  
“If it is true that the grid of ‘surveillance’ is everywhere becoming more extensive 
and precise, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society is not 
reduced to it, what popular procedures (also ‘miniscule’ and quotidian) play with 
the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them only in order to ‘turn’ them, 
and finally, what ‘ways of doing’ form the counterpart, on the consumer's (or 
dominés) side, of the mute processes that organise the establishment of 
socioeconomic order.”41 
This is a call for being more curious about how popular practices engage surveillance 
in disruptive ways. It asks for an analysis of everyday practices and situations that do 
not simply reproduce a matrix of surveillance or an existing socioeconomic order. In 
line with a wider literature on the everyday in the 1970s and 80s, it questions an 
overly reproductive or deterministic reading of relations of domination in which the 
dominated are either reduced to objects of domination or functionalised as 
reproductive of a given order. Lefebvre’s classic ‘trilogy’ Critique of everyday life42 
dealt with this in the context of Marxist reductions of consumption, entertainment and 
other mundane practices as mainly reproductive of capitalism.43 The quote from de 
                                                
41 Translation largely taken from the English translation but slightly changed by me based on French 
original. 
de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven F. Rendall. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984 [1980]) p. xiv 
de Certeau, Michel. L'invention du quotidien. 1. arts de faire. (Paris: Gallimard, 1990 [1980]), pp. 
xxxix-xl. 
42 Lefebvre, Henri. Critique of Everyday Life. Volume 1.  (London: Verso, 2008). 
Lefebvre, Henri. Critique of Everyday Life. Volume 2: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday.  
(London: Verso, 2008). 
Lefebvre, Henri. Critique of Everyday Life. Volume 3: From Modernity to Modernism.  (London: 
Verso, 2008). 
43 This was a wide spread issue of debate in the 1970 and 80s in Europe. It included among others the 
move towards Alltagsgeschichte in Germany, and (post-)Marxist cultural studies in the UK. 
Eley, Geoff. "Labor history, social history, Alltagsgeschichte: experience, culture, and the politics of 
the everyday - a new direction for German social history."  The Journal of Modern History 61:2, 1989, 
pp. 297-343 
Williams, Raymond. Marxism and literature. (Oxford: Oxford university press, 1977). 
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Certeau makes a similar move in relation to structural readings of surveillance as an 
expanding dystopian system of coercion and domination and Foucaultian approaches 
that read surveillance in terms of a panoptic relation and total institutions in which the 
watched internalise patterns of practice that keep challenges in check.  
 
Such a curiosity resonates well with the interest in surveillance studies in ordinary 
practices and possibilities of resistance when surveillance is intimately embedded in 
everyday life and works largely at a distance. Much of extitutional surveillance is 
extremely entangled into everyday activities but at the same time very much an 
intangible presence. For example, email and chats are difficult to avoid but the data 
extractions and knowledge assembling remain a rather abstract something that takes 
place somewhere else and through ‘mysterious’ calculations. It is quite different from 
being watched by a border or security guard with whom one can — and on occasion 
must — interact. The political question of ‘the everyday’ is here not simply one of 
how surveillance operates through and in mundane sites and practice but mainly if 
and how disrupting power is and can be exercised by subjects who are so embedded 
in surveillance that they cannot really own the situation. How can autonomy and 
political relevance be understood and exercised by those who can only act from a 
position of weakness, from a position of being owned by ‘the system’?44 
 
This curiosity in ‘the everyday’ and ‘the power of the weak’ is similar to feminist 
arguments for lingering with sites, practices and subjects outside of the familiar 
institutions of power. They have done considerable work showing the power of 
women’s practices which from the perspective of institutionalised power and its 
corresponding analyses are politically considered what one could call ‘little nothings’. 
Little nothings are practices and things that are treated as fractured, singular, or 
routine and enacted as if they do not weigh on wider social and political concerns. In 
feminist analysis diplomats’ wives hosting dinners and receptions, migrating female 
domestic workers, beauty parlours in a war zone and so on are relevant for both 
understanding and shaping distributions and techniques of power. It renders visible 
                                                                                                                                      
 
44 Scott, James C. Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts. (New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press, 1992 [1987]); de Certeau (1990 [1980]), pp. 59-60. 
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the patriarchal nature of political institutions and the limits of understanding power in 
the terms reproduced by these institutions.45 
 
Marx, Gilliom and Monahan, Aas and colleagues, Ball and others do something 
similar in surveillance studies.46 They move from treating surveillance as a system, 
structure, or institution that enacts its own logic of governance to a social situation. 
Surveillance professionals, companies, institutions and technologies do not simply 
impose what surveillance practice is, can do, and can be. They do not operate in a 
passive social environment. Surveillance is enacted — in the sense of acted out, acted 
into being and transformed — in a complex situation full of little practices and things 
which make surveillance situations into what they are but which are institutionally 
either ignored or represented as annoying frictions or deviancies that need to be 
neutralised. For example, Garry Marx introduced the concept of neutralising 
techniques to invite analyses of resistance to surveillance technology that move 
beyond strategic responses such as challenging a law or organising a boycott. 
Neutralising practices are a wide variety of practices through which those subjected to 
a surveillance technology seek to counter its effective working in the specific 
situations where they are subjected to the technology. Among the examples are 
switching urine samples, encrypting communication, advance warnings of upcoming 
drug test from supervisors, destroying skin of finger tops, using another person’s ID 
or a false passport.47 Paying attention to these practices questions that surveillance 
technologies, however inescapable they are, exist in a ‘passive environment of total 
inequality.’ They operate in ‘complex, pre-existing situations’ which include not only 
strategic challenges by social movements, for example, but also individual, largely 
uncoordinated disruptions and appropriations.48  
                                                
45 Enloe, Cynthia. Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International Relations. 
(London: Pandora, 1989); Wibben, Annick T.R. Feminist security studies. A narrative approach. 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
46 Marx, Garry T. "A tack in the shoe and taking off the shoe: neutralization and counter-neutralization 
dynamics."  Surveillance & Society 6:3, 2009a, pp. 294-306; Gilliom, John, and Torin Monahan. 
"Everyday resistance." In Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty and David Lyon (eds) Routledge handbook 
of surveillance studies, (London: Routledge, 2012), pp 405-411; Aas, Katja Franko, H. Oppen 
Gundhus, and Heidi Mork Lomell (eds) Technologies of (In)security: The surveillance of everyday life. 
(London, Routledge, 2008); Ball, Kirstie. "Organization, surveillance and the body: towards a politics 
of resistance." In David Lyon (ed) Theorizing surveillance (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 2006), pp. 
296-317. 
47 Marx, Garry T. "A tack in the shoe: neutralizing and resisting the new surveillance."  Journal of 
social issues 59:2, 2009b, p. 298 
48 Marx (2009b), pp. 295-96. 
   
 18 
 
Being curious about these ‘little nothings’ does not aim at uncovering secrets but is a 
mode of enquiry that focuses on the power of that what is kept trivial and practices of 
trivialising, banalising, ignoring, and forgetting. This is similar to how Cynthia Enloe 
deploys curiosity in her feminist work.49 At issue is not that women’s practices and 
lives are secret and deserve unmasking but rather that they are taken for granted and 
thus kept off the analytical and political agendas. Feminist curiosity is for her a 
method of undoing the work of trivialising women’s lives and their contributions to 
world politics. Trivialising is a powerful practice which is highly institutionalised — 
e.g. in textbooks, in modes of valuing work, in methods of academic work. For Enloe, 
‘uncuriosity’ is a practice and attitude that is reproductive of existing power relations. 
For feminism, this is the patriarchal system that marginalises the feminine; for 
surveillance studies it is the continuing expansion of surveillance society and its 
social sorting. If contentious issues arise, like has been happening in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations, the possible political consequences and implications are indeed 
partly held in check by trivialising statements, implying that there is really nothing 
special or controversial about surveillance. I am thinking of statements that point out 
that people are involved in creating data about themselves every day without seeming 
to mind or that imply that people are naive if they really belief that the private data 
they generate on-line or by using mobile phones is theirs to control. The implication 
of such statements is that surveillance is a banality, a fact of daily life and so why 
bother questioning it. As Enloe underlines, absence of curiosity is ‘dangerously 
comfortable’, and in extension institutionally reproductive. It re-iterates variations 
within acceptable boundaries and understandings of how the world works — in 
academia this is often accompanied by what she refers to as ‘the sophisticated attire of 
reasonableness and intellectual efficiency’: “We can’t be investigating everything!”’50  
 
As a mode of enquiry curiosity implies hanging out in the casual, private, informal, 
routine; in little spaces and moments. Although such enquiry can be conducted within 
bounded institutions, I want to highlight that such a method is particularly prone to 
taking us to places and relations that are (kept) outside of the familiar institutional 
repertoires and seeks to understand their political significance. When Cynthia Enloe 
                                                
49 Enloe, Cynthia. The curious feminist. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 
50 Enloe (2004), p. 3 
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brings us an analysis of the intervention of Iraq and its consequences she moves our 
gaze from the battlefield, diplomatic negotiations, and the reconstruction of political 
institutions to beauty parlours, changing house occupancy in a Baghdad 
neighbourhood, statements by a teenage girl surviving a house raid, and so on.51 Each 
of these is not completely detached from institutions and what in international politics 
are considered the sites and processes of political power but neither are they bound or 
contained by them. They are extitutional moments, claims, places that enact the 
situation of war and they matter for the shaping of social relations as well as political 
subjectivity and legitimacy. This mode of curiosity is therefore more than including 
an analysis of the informal, private, trivial, banal, everyday; its direction is 
extitutional, drawing attention to diffuse relations that enact situations beyond 
bounded institutions. 
 
So far, I have proposed ‘curiosity’ as a specific mode of researching and knowing the 
everyday by taking the power of little nothings and the extitutional work they do 
serious. It is a method of disrupting the power of trivialising and making insignificant. 
It introduces sensitivity to how surveillance practices are not simply subjecting but 
themselves subjected to the work of many little nothings, which seems to become 
even more pertinent when surveillance leaves its operational mode derived from 
panoptic institutions and becomes thoroughly embedded in a myriad of diffuse 
everyday practices. Drawing attention to the power of ‘little nothings’ thus captures a 
wider sociological, political and normative interest in diffuse agency in contexts of 
extitutional surveillance and derives from dissatisfaction with too dystopian 
sociological readings of surveillance as an imposing system. In line with the aim of 
this article to foreground the question of democracy more outspokenly in surveillance 
studies, I want to add a more particular take on curiosity, however.  To that purpose, 
the next two sections develop ‘democracy’ as an analytical modality that defines the 
political nature of little nothings in a quite specific way. In other words, the remaining 
question is: what does it mean for curiosity to be a democratic mode of enquiry? 
                                                
51 Enloe, Cynthia. Nimo's war, Emma's war. Making feminist sense of the Iraq war. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010) 
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From	resistance	to	situations	of	multiplicity	
The curiosity set out in the previous section is in itself a democratising move. It draws 
attention to how practices treated as passively undergoing and/or being merely 
reproductive play an active role in shaping and contesting surveillance practices, 
techniques and institutions and their legitimacy. Such a move is an analytical 
expression of the democratic idea that power and conferring legitimacy are not 
limited to those in governing or dominant positions but is more widely distributed 
across people — rulers and ruled, elite and ordinary people, experts and non-experts, 
and so on.  
 
Yet, the democratic qualification of curiosity I want to develop goes further than this 
democratising analytics that is inherent in curiosity. ‘Democratic curiosity’ gives a 
particular inflection on this more horizontal, distributive conception of power that 
differentiates it from resistance. Conceptions of resistance commonly organise how 
surveillance studies understand the political significance of little nothings. In these 
works, resistance refers in the first to dispersed practices and arrangements that 
disrupt the imposition of surveillance rather than instances of collective mobilisation 
for the purpose of disrupting or changing a situation. They can take the form of 
individualised or dispersed neutralising actions52 like destroying identity documents, 
disrupting cctv cameras and trolling53 or issue specific dispersed protests like the no-
google glass campaign in which people challenge those wearing google glasses. 
Appropriations of surveillance technology and practice are another mode of 
resistance, such as sousveillance in which elites and security professionals are put 
under surveillance by ordinary people who are present in surveillance situations or by 
those subjected to surveillance. 54  Resistance to surveillance has also been 
conceptualised as friction which foregrounds dispersed bodily becoming and 
situational unpredictability when the possibility for reflective moments from which to 
draw intentional resistance are limited.55 
 
                                                
52 Marx (2009a) 
53 Trolling refers here to hacktivist actions disrupting or destroying data sites 
54 Mann, Steve, Jason Nollman, and Barry Wellman. "Sousveillance: inventing and using wearable 
computing devices for data collection in surveillance environments."  Surveillance & Society 1:3, 2003, 
pp. 331-355 
55 Ball (2006); Huysmans (2014), pp. 158-172. 
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Using the concept of ‘resistance’ has an important limitation for understanding 
diffusing power, even when conceptualised as above, however. It tends to account for 
diffuse relations in terms of a main dyadic relation that opposes one group against 
another, one mode of living against another. Even when practices are taken as 
distributed, resistance analyses tend to arrange the multiplicity as expressions of an 
aggregate antagonism. In the case of surveillance this usually opposes surveiller and 
surveilled or the imposition of surveillance system and the challenging practices by 
those subjected to it.  
 
An extitutional understanding of democracy for me demands retaining a greater 
multiplicity of relations, however. The main reason is that extitutional relations are 
highly diffuse and multiple; reducing these relations to a general opposition between a 
system and resistance by those subjected to it considerably limits our understanding 
of what politics can be in these situations. I therefore want to propose democratic 
curiosity as a mode of enquiry that seeks to retain a greater diversity in the conflicts 
that are at play and a more ambiguous understanding of the relation between 
surveillers and surveilled. It draws attention to non-dialectically organised 
multiplicity. It is similar to Alina Sajed’s proposal to reinterpret the politics of dissent 
under Communist regimes in Europe during the Cold War. For her domination did not 
simply engender dissent. It engendered instead ‘a plethora of practices of coping, 
survival, negotiation, contestation, accommodation and complicity, all of which can 
overlap and coexist in tension with one another within the lived experience of the 
same actor.’56 If we take this serious then the analytical – and political – challenge is 
to account for the democratic political quality of such ‘a plethora of practices’  
 
The immediate implication is that surveillance becomes a social situation rather than a 
technique, technology or system. It is shaped by the relations between multiple 
practices of surveilling, appropriating, working around, resisting, and so on. 
Analytically one can start from instances of institutional exercise of power or as is 
often the case in post-panoptic analyses of surveillance, the technological and 
networked practices of extracting information from populations or societies. Yet, they 
                                                
56 Sajed, Alina. "Everyday encounters with the global behind the Iron Curtain: imagining freedom, 
desiring liberalism in socialist Romania."  Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24:4, 2011, p. 
560. 
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can at best be a methodological entry point into understanding a situation that is 
created by immanent constellations of practices and things within which technologies, 
data, and surveillance institutions are embedded.  For example, Gavin Smith’s work 
on CCTV monitoring interprets CCTV operations through multiple banal interactions 
between security staff, the monitored and the camera.57 Although he retains a largely 
dyadic set up between watchers and the watched, their relation is not one of control 
versus resistance. The security staffs do not simply enact the logic of social control 
that is inscribed into the surveillance technology, the culture of operation and the 
reason for their instalment. They find themselves in various social situations 
involving relations to those they watch, relations between themselves, and relations 
with their employers. The relations involve resistances, compassion, implicit 
agreements, complicity, negotiating, and so on. This multiplicity of relations is what 
makes the surveillance situation into what it is – and is not. Surveillance can therefore 
not be reduced to a confrontation between a surveillance system and resisting 
practices by those surveilled. Of course, it makes a difference for the understanding of 
surveillance whether one takes as analytical entry point CCTV in an urban 
environment or Bullrun, a classified decryption programme run by the NSA as 
revealed by Snowden. Yet, the reason is not the difference between the operational 
rationale of either CCTV or Bullrun but the difference in the relations between people 
and things within which the technical devices exist. 
 
Similarly, Kirstie Ball et al research how surveillance practices are shaped by and 
impact on people’s working conditions, travel arrangements, and so on in 
contemporary counter-terrorism policies by looking at changing working conditions 
in travel agencies.58 Surveillance and counter-terrorism at first sight seem to be a 
matter of state and international security institutions imposing intelligence practices 
onto travel agencies. Yet, when looking in more detail at the everyday working, 
expressions of concerns, and modes of dealing with security demands, it is clear that 
the practice and arrangement of surveillance and counter-terrorism is heavily shaped 
by how travel agencies integrate the demands imposed on them in their everyday 
                                                
57 Smith, Gavin J.D. "Exploring relations between watchers and watched in control(led) systems: 
strategies and tactics."  Surveillance & Society 4:4, 2007,pp. 280-313; Smith, Gavin J.D. "Empowered 
watchers or disempowered workers? The ambiguities of power within technologies of security." In 
Katja Franco Aas, Helene Oppen Gundhus and Heidi Mork Lomell (eds) Technologies of insecurity. 
The surveillance of everyday life (London, Routledge, 2009), pp. 125-146. 
58 Ball et al. (2015), chapter 7 
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practices and negotiate them in light of their commercial interests and their 
implications for labour relations. Surveillance is enacted within a ‘texture of everyday 
living’; it is shaped by the ephemeral emergence of a variety of practices engaging 
surveillance, its technology, and its cultures and modes of operation.59 The travel 
agencies are not simply implementing the demand for surveillance from security 
institutions; they are actively reworking this demand by reworking their daily 
practices and procedures which involves various conflicts, frictions, disagreements, 
compromises, appropriations and so on. Analytically the travel agencies appear less as 
‘actors’ implementing or resisting and more as sites in which multiple relations, 
emotions, and concerns enact surveillance. 
 
Although Gavin Smith seems to imply in his work that the main gain from such an 
approach that introduces ‘many diverse and conflicting forms and strategies’ is a more 
diversified understanding of everyday enactment of surveillance, the more radical 
implication of these two examples is that surveillance moves from a dyadic relation of 
control into a complex social situation.60 In doing so, the analytics of power changes 
from a dialectic between domination and resistance to immanent relations between 
little nothings and institutional practices that enact between them what surveillance 
and its limits are.   
Uncoordinated	disputes	
Such a reading of the political significance of little nothings differs from introducing 
politics into sociologies of surveillance by means of looking for resisting practices. 
However, it also seems to reduce the enactment of surveillance to a social rather than 
political situation. To an extent that is what the category of ‘democracy’ does: it seeks 
to value the political significance of what takes place socially. Yet, democracy does 
more. Democratic practice explicitly works the boundary between the social and 
political; it is a practice of naming the social as politically significant but as also 
distinct from the political.61 In other words, democracy is also about the passage to 
                                                
59 Sajed (2011), p. 563 
60 Smith (2007), p. 292. 
A similar case for breaking down dyadic renditions of surveillance but more narrowly focused on 
multiplying the actors included in surveillance studies is made by Martin, van Brakel, and Bernhard. 
Martin, Aaron K., Rosamunde E. van Brakel, and Daniel J. Bernhard. "Understanding Resistance to 
Digital Surveillance. Towards a Multi-Disciplinary, Multi-Actor Framework." Surveillance & Society 
6:3, 2009, p. 217. 
61 Rancière, Jacques. La haine de la démocratie. (Paris: La fabrique éditions, 2005), p. 70. 
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politics – of the social becoming political – and the organisation of both the boundary 
between the social and the political and the devices of passage from one to the other.62 
The discussion of the democratic modality of curiosity can therefore not be concluded 
at this point. Although moving from dialectic readings to immanent conceptions of 
power is a key element of this modality, it does not in itself provide us with a 
conception of what defines the democratic political modality of extitutional practice if 
not an aggregating dialectic between domination and resistance?  
 
I propose that extitutional politics takes the form of uncoordinated practices in which 
modes of autonomy, rights and dispositions of acceptability are put into dispute. 
Disputes are non-dialectic conflicting enactments of rights, autonomy and 
dispositions of acceptability.63 To explain what this means, I will start from John 
Gilliom’s study of surveillance of the welfare poor in Appalachia.64 His study looks at 
how women depending on welfare benefits cope in situations of increased and 
intensified surveillance that makes access to welfare benefits more difficult. They 
practice non-compliance, masking and misrepresentation. Despite the analysis 
drawing heavily on conceptions of resistance — and in particular James Scott’s 
work65 — I want to draw on it for its conception of the politicality of uncoordinated 
actions of the women in intensified surveillance situations. 
 
The women Gilliom interviewed mainly try to make ends meet by taking on small 
paid jobs without declaring them, not volunteering information, and so on. Despite 
most of these practices being unorganised, lacking any explicit ideological 
justification, being organised in response to immediate daily concerns, such as 
assuring sufficient food and the possibility to buy clothes for their children, and being 
largely hidden, they have political significance. The women create autonomous spaces 
and moments of live that have value in their own right with distinct and disputed 
                                                
62 Bayart, Jean-François, Achille Mbembe, and Comi Toulabor. Le politique par le bas en Afrique 
noire. (Paris: Karthala, 2008), p. 26. 
63 Although the concept of ‘dispute’ as used here draws on Boltanski and Thévenot’s studies (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 1991, 1999), I am not following the precise meaning they give to the concept, which in 
their use is explicitly focused on practices of justification. For the purpose of this paper I am more 
interested in developing the uncoordinated quality of disputes. 
64 Gilliom, John. Overseers of the poor: surveillance, resistance, and the limits of privacy. (Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 2001) 
65 Scott, James C. Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts. (New Haven CT: Yale 
University Press, 1992) 
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conceptions of what is legitimate practice and what not. Gilliom interprets their 
practices as uncoordinated modes of resisting that create collective consciousness and 
strategic opposition, but without collective mobilisation.66 
 
Instead of focusing on ‘resistance’, an alternative reading of these practices is possible 
that sees them as bringing in circulation multiple, uncoordinated disputes. In that case 
one looks not for how their actions resist the practices of surveillance institutions but 
what kind of disputes over conceptions of right, autonomy and acceptability are 
present in the actions they take. Disputes link little practices to broader political 
questions of conflicts between and transformations of frameworks of rights, autonomy 
and dispositions of acceptability. Gilliom organises the ethical positions and 
frameworks — e.g. as expressed in statements like ‘I think as long as someone is 
using what they are doing for their home, or they are buying something that their kids 
need, I don’t see anything wrong with it.’ — into an uncoordinated framework 
actioned by the women against the frameworks of surveillance institutions. The 
proposal here, however, is to keep them distributed as multiple disputes, enacting 
various frameworks, that are not necessarily consciously or strategically created but 
that simply take shape in how the women, but also the welfare services, their 
neighbours and others go about their daily life.  In certain situations it may indeed be 
the case that the various little disputes become strategically codified and enacted as an 
opposition between the welfare poor and the welfare institutions. Yet, that will require 
coordination actions and strategic mobilisation. In other situations these disputes can 
remain fractured and uncoordinated within the many daily activities in which the 
welfare poor engage, exchange, act in compliance, appropriate situations, create 
opportunities, and so on.  Taking these practices as defining the situation rather than 
as a principle antagonism between two groups — those who have the right to be here 
and those without this right, citizens versus undocumented migrants, the well-off 
versus the poor, the rulers and the ruled — introduces a more relational and complex 
situation in which multiple conceptions of right and wrong and autonomy circulate 
                                                
66 “In the end, the everyday resistance seen among the Appalachian welfare poor formed a pattern of 
widespread behavior that produced or supported an array of important material and symbolic results, 
including cash and other necessities of survival, a status of autonomy, a potentially powerful collective 
consciousness of the struggle of welfare mothering, and a strategic opposition to and undermining of 
surveillance mechanisms.”  
Gilliom, John. "Resisting Surveillance." Social Text  23:2, 2005, p. 77. 
   
 26 
and are in dispute. It avoids reifying a particular group as by definition 
‘problematic’ 67  — such as treating poor women or undocumented migrants as 
profiteers or frauds that need disciplining. At issue is not ‘a group’ but the multiple 
disputes that are enacted in particular situations and the multiple frameworks of 
rights, autonomy and dispositions of acceptability that are enacted as disagreements 
about what counts as legitimate practice. 
 
The extitutional approach to uncoordinated arrangement I am proposing here 
interprets connections by means of the trajectories and movements through which the 
disputes take shape, rather than in terms of a set of ‘rules of the game’ or intentions of 
a group. Tirado and Domènech explain this methodological shift by means of Michel 
Serres’ reading of a football game.68 One option is to read the game from the agreed 
rules that define how the game is to be played and what is permissible and not. 
Another is to understand a particular game from the intentions of the team and 
collective mobilisation against another team. Serres proposes however a third way 
that interprets the game in terms of the relations that are created through the flow of 
the ball. These flows connect people, shape patterns of relations, and so on.69 The 
relations created through movement and their trajectories have priority over the 
instituted rules or group identity and mobilisation. For example, in relation to the 
Snowden revelations one would not set up the analysis as a confrontation between a 
security apparatus imposing surveillance upon a society and the opposition mobilised 
by those subjected to the surveillance. Instead one could take a set of data flows that 
Snowden revealed and follow which agencies are brought in relation through their 
circulation, what conflicts between them arise and how these conflicts bring various 
conceptions of rights, autonomy, and acceptability in play. One of the consequences 
of such an analysis would certainly be that politics becomes more fractured, involving 
more sites of dispute and agents bearing upon the formation and limits of 
surveillance. It would most certainly also bring into play a much more diffuse set of 
conceptions of legitimate and illegitimate practices than one opposing security to 
privacy, or state to society. This will be particularly the case because disputes are not 
                                                
67 Nicholas de Genova makes a similar point in relation to undocumented migrants. 
de Genova, Nicholas. "The queer politics of migration: reflections on 'illegality' and incorrigibility."  
Studies in social justice 4:2, 2010, pp. 101-126 
68 Tirado and Domènech (2013) P. 135 
69 Serres, Michel. The parasite. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982 [1980]), pp. 224-230.  
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in the first instance spectacular conflicts between major agencies. The disputes 
‘democratic curiosity’ seeks to bring into the analysis are mostly what appear as little 
nothings, nuisances, banalities. They would include things like controversies between 
programmers, differences in uses of the internet, meetings in the corridors between 
NSA representatives and representatives of internet companies, ‘confrontations’ 
between encryption programmes, and so on. As disputes these little nothings are 
distinctly political, however, because they bring in an uncoordinated way conflicting 
conceptions of rights, autonomy and dispostions of acceptability to bear upon the 
social situation. The latter is how the social is being read as political by ‘democratic 
curiosity’; how this mode of enquiry brings into focus an uncoordinated passage from 
the social to the political.  
Being	democratically	curious	
 
The lead question of this paper was: what can a ‘democratic analytics of surveillance’ 
be that takes us beyond institutional repertoires of democratic action?  There are two 
related reasons for raising this question. First, although the impact of surveillance on 
democracy is a key political question, even more so after the Snowden revelations, 
democracy remains mostly an unquestioned category in security and surveillance 
studies. The second reason is that democratic repertoires remain strongly linked to 
institutionally circumscribed entities and practices while surveillance is increasingly 
extitutional. Such situations call for revisiting what democratic power can be in 
extitutional situations. Combined these observations ask for lingering longer and in 
more detail with the question of democracy in security and surveillance studies, and 
in particular with developing a democratic analytics of surveillance that draws on an 
extitutional understanding of democratic power.  
 
I proposed the notion of ‘democratic curiosity’ as a tool for capturing this challenge 
and starting to respond to it. Curiosity is a mode of analysis that brings into analytical 
play the power and significance for (re)shaping situations of surveillance of that what 
is considered to be powerless. In doing so it disrupts institutional self-representations 
of surveillance structures and practices and creates space for that what is mostly kept 
of the political surveillance agendas. In that sense, curiosity is in itself a 
democratising mode of enquiry. However, there is more to the democratic 
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qualification of curiosity that I introduced than this; otherwise, I could have just 
limited myself to speaking of ‘curiosity’. The democratic qualifier adds two elements. 
First, it conceptualises surveillance as a social situation shaped and transformed by a 
multiplicity of practices that are held in immanent relations. This may seem common 
sense but it is not. It implies something quite specific; it challenges dialectic modes of 
analysis that take surveillance as a confrontation between a surveillance system that 
seeks to impose a particular governmental logic and the mobilisation of those trying 
to resist or escape it. Democratic curiosity retains power as being multiple, immanent 
and diffuse as long as possible; that is, until there is clear evidence that in a particular 
situation coordination work has transformed a multiplicity of relations indeed into a 
dialectic antagonism between two groups — the surveillers and the surveilled. 
Secondly, the democratic modality implies that non-dialectic social situations can 
become political without having to transform into dialectics of domination and 
resistance. Little nothings are political in so far they enact uncoordinated disputes in 
which multiple disagreements about conceptions of rights, autonomy, and dispositions 
of acceptability are brought to bear upon and shape what surveillance is and can be.  
 
Being democratically curious is a mode of knowing that seeks to respond to Torin 
Monahan’s concern that in surveillance studies and debates ‘a focus on institutional-
level power dynamics has been a gravitational force, pulling other scholarly 
approaches into its orbit and sometimes eclipsing promising alternative modes of 
inquiry.’ 70  Democratic curiosity seeks to address in particular the issue that 
democracy is taken too readily in its institutional terms even in situations where 
surveillance is considered to have gone largely extitutional. It adds a question mark to 
taking resistance as the default category for bringing in extra-institutional practices in 
security and surveillance studies. It also explicitly shares a political concern with 
Cynthia Enloe and curious feminists that “[s]o many power structures — inside 
households, within institutions, in societies, in international affairs — are dependent 
on our continuing lack of curiosity.” 71  The democratic approach I propose is 
specifically attentive to practices and movements that shape and reshape situations 
through scattered and uncoordinated disputes. I do not present this as a claim of a new 
political ontology replacing a politics of resistance in the current situation but rather 
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as a particular methodological move that aims at bringing out the political 
significance of scattered little insignificant practices, things and relations so as to 
extitutionalise democratic power. In other words, it is not a claim that resistance or 
institutional democratic politics has had its time — has become a zombie politics72. I 
have no ground to argue that. I do think however that it is important in situations and 
times of extitutional surveillance to think democratic politics in more fractured ways 
and to be curious about the political power of diffuse little practices and things in their 
own right.  
 
Let me conclude, however, by cautioning against taking ‘democratic curiosity’ and 
‘democracy’ more generally as an unproblematic category, in particular in the study of 
surveillance. Surveillance is to a considerable extent a practice of finding out hidden 
information or assembling isolated bits of information into new knowledge about 
individuals, groups and relations that could not be gathered from the individual bits of 
information as such. Curiosity is thus a modus operandi of surveillance. Moreover, 
curiosity has a problematic relation to democracy, in particular with the latter’s calls 
for transparency, and more broadly, publicity. As Jodie Dean has extensively argued 
the democratic call for ever more transparency and publicity as a condition for 
democratic power can institute suspicion as the organising principle of politics, 
implying an increasing legitimacy of surveillance.73 The imperative to make things 
available for public debate, can lead to situations in which wanting to retain things for 
oneself, keep things out of the public eye, is by definition rendered as suspicious: 
‘Not wanting to make things public! You must have something important to hide. We 
definitely need to uncover this secret in the public interest.’ Surveillance is thus not 
anathema to democratic politics but can become an integrated and fundamental part of 
its mode of operating. In that case, being democratically curios becomes a mode of 
enquiry that does not problematise surveillance through mobilising democratic 
categories but rather on the contrary sustains a close connection between the two and 
foregrounds a politics of suspicion. Treading carefully with ‘curiosity’ by keeping it 
firmly linked with the question of the power of little nothings and trivialising – rather 
than uncovering secrets – as well as delinking democracy from unchecked calls for 
                                                
72 Beck, Ulrich. "The cosmopolitan society and its enemies."  Theory, Culture & Society 19:1-2 (2002) 
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73 Dean, Jodi. Publicity's secret. How technoculture capitalizes on democracy. (Ithaca: Cornell 
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transparency by defining democracy as the recognition of the political significance of 
uncoordinated disputes is therefore particularly important for security and 
surveillance studies. 
